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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5969
Historically, development banks have been an important 
instrument of governments to promote economic growth 
by providing credit and a wide range of advisory and 
capacity building programs to households, small and 
medium enterprises , and even large private corporations, 
whose financial needs are not sufficiently served by 
private commercial banks or local capital markets. 
During the current financial crisis, most development 
banks in Latin America, followed by Asia, Africa, and 
Europe, have assumed a countercyclical role by scaling 
up their lending operations exactly when private 
banks experienced temporary difficulties in granting 
This paper is a product of the Financial Systems Practice, Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency. It is 
part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development 
policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The authors may be contacted at jdelunamartinez@worldbank.org or cvicente@worldbank.org.
credit to the private sector. Despite the importance of 
development banks during crisis and non-crisis periods, 
little is known about them. This survey examines how 
development banks operate, what their policy mandates 
are, what financial services they offer, which type of 
clients they target, how they are regulated and supervised, 
what business models they have adopted, what 
governance framework they have, and what challenges 
they face. It also examines the countercyclical role played 
by development banks during the recent financial crisis. 
This survey is based on new data that have been collected 
from 90 national development banks in 61 countries. 
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In spite of the wave of privatizations of state-owned financial institutions (SFIs) that has taken place over 
the past 30 years, SFIs still constitute an important part in the financial system. On average, they account 
for 25% of total assets in banking systems around the world. In the European Union, for example, SFIs 
represent 30% of the total financial system (Schmit, 2011). In the so-called BRIC countries alone  – 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China – the market share of SFIs is substantially higher. 
 
SFIs include a wide variety of institutions, such as commercial banks, development banks, postal banks, 
insurance companies, credit guarantee funds, leasing firms, etc. Development banks (DBs), also called 
development financial institutions or policy banks, are typically the largest type of SFI. Historically, 
governments established DBs to provide credit and other financial services to individuals, firms and 
strategic sectors of the economy that private financial institutions were unable or unwilling to serve to the 
extent desired by policy-makers.  
 
During the global financial crisis of 2008-2010, most DBs played a countercyclical role by providing 
credit to private firms that were temporarily unable to access funding from private commercial banks or 
capital markets. This has renewed the interest of policy-makers in various jurisdictions on the role of DBs 
during periods of economic distress. Moreover, the financial crisis triggered new debates on the role of 
the state in the economy and, in particular, the financial sector.  
 
Despite their size and importance, little is known about DBs. Past research on DBs has focused on 
examining their performance and comparing them to private financial institutions (Hanson 2003, Laporta 
2000). Other studies have examined the reasons for the failure of select DBs (Viral, 2011). But apart from 
few case studies of a small number of individual institutions or specific regions (Rudolph 2009; Schmit, 
2011), little is known about how DBs operate, what their policy mandates are, what financial services 
they offer, which type of clients they target, how they are regulated and supervised, what business models 
they have adopted, what governance framework they have, and what challenges they face.   
 
The World Bank has received an increasing number of requests for data and new studies about DBs. 
These requests are motivated by ongoing efforts in various countries to strengthen their own DBs by 
insulating them from undue political interference, transforming them into more profitable and financially 
self-sustainable organizations, and adopting innovative governance arrangements.  
 
In  response  to  this  demand,  the  World  Bank  and  the  World  Federation  of  Development  Financial 
Institutions (WFDFI) launched a survey to analyze the features and challenges faced by existing DBs, 
particularly those in low- and middle-income countries. The survey contained 72 questions (see Annex 
for  the  full  list  of  questions)  grouped  into  seven  specific  areas:  size,  funding,  business  models  and 
products, profitability and asset quality, corporate governance, regulation and supervision, and challenges. 
The survey was conducted between January and June 2011 with the members of the WFDFI and the 
regional associations of development banks in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America.  
 
This report summarizes the key findings of the survey. Although the survey answers some questions and 
provides new data of DBs, it also raises new questions and concerns. We expect that the findings of the 3 
 
survey will encourage others to use the database, explore further the issues discussed, and continue to 
advance our understanding of DBs. 
   4 
 
1.  Sample and Methodological Notes 
 
For the purpose of this survey, a DB is defined as a bank or financial institution with at least 30 percent 
state-owned equity that has been given an explicit legal mandate to reach socioeconomic goals in a 
region, sector or particular market segment.  
 
The survey is based on a questionnaire that was sent to the 280 members of the World Federation of 
Development Financial Institutions and the regional associations of development banks in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, Latin America, and Middle East. The diversity of DBs that participated in the survey, in terms of 
size,  type,  region,  and  performance  suggests  that  the  sampled  DBs  will  likely  share  important 
characteristics with all the other existing DBs. 
 
A total of 106 responses were received, however, 16 did not meet the survey‟s definition of a DB and 
were therefore excluded. The remaining responses from 90 DBs in 61 countries served as the basis for 
this report (see Annex for the list of respondent DBs). Participation in the survey was purely voluntary, 
with no bias against any type or jurisdiction of DB.  
 
Table 1. Survey Respondents by Region and Country  





1.  Angola 
2.  Côte d'Ivoire 
3.  Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
4.  Ghana 
5.  Kenya 
6.  Nigeria 
7.  Rwanda   
8.  South Africa 
9.  Sudan 
10. Tanzania 
11. Uganda 
12.  Antigua and 
Barbuda 
13.  Bolivia 
14.  Brazil 
15.  Canada 
16.  Colombia 
17.  Costa Rica 
18.  Curacao 
19.  Dominican 
Republic 
20.  Ecuador 
21.  Guatemala 
22.  Mexico 
23.  Paraguay 
24.  Peru 
25.  Uruguay 
26.  Venezuela 
27.  Bangladesh 
28.  Bhutan 
29.  Cambodia 
30.  China, 
People's Rep.  
31.  Cook Islands 
32.  Fiji   
33.  India 
34.  Malaysia 
35.  Micronesia 
36.  Mongolia  
37.  Nepal 
38.  Niue Island 
39.  Pakistan 
40.  Palau 
41.  Philippines 
42.  Samoa 
43.  Sri Lanka 
44.  Thailand 
45.  Tonga  
46.  Vanuatu 

















With the exception of the Middle East and North Africa regions, from where only two responses were 
received, a satisfactory response rate was achieved in all other regions of the world. Additional responses 
may arrive and will be reflected in an updated publication. 
 
There are four important caveats with regard to the data in the survey. First, the data come directly from 
responses by senior managers of each DB. There was no third-party assessment of the data. These senior 
managers had the opportunity to review and validate their institution‟s data.  
 
Secondly, several topics were intentionally omitted from the scope of the survey. For instance, the survey 
does not explore the effectiveness of DBs in terms of fulfilling their mandates, nor does the survey 
examine the impact of DBs‟ operations in the development of local private financial systems. These are 
all  important  topics,  but  given  their  complexity  they  should  be  treated  separately  using  a  different 
methodology.  
 
Thirdly, the distinction between a development bank and a commercial bank is not always clear. A few 
institutions  included  in  the  survey,  such  as  Banco  Nacional  de  Costa  Rica  which  sees  itself  as  a 
development bank, are considered by some observers as a commercial bank because of the scale of their 
commercial banking operations. The authors decided to keep these types of institutions in the survey, as 
long as they complied with the definition of DBs described earlier.  
 
Finally, multilateral, regional, and sub-regional development banks were excluded from the survey in 
order to concentrate the focus on national development banks, in particular of DBs in low- and middle-
income countries.  
 
2.  Establishment, Size, and Countercyclical Role of DBs  
 
Historically,  DBs  have  been  an  important  instrument  used  by  governments  to  promote  economic 
development in practically all countries around the world, regardless of their stage of development. DBs 
have  been  established  in  former  socialist  economies,  advanced  capitalist  countries  and  emerging 
economies to finance the construction of roads, highways, energy plants, dams, and telecommunication 
infrastructure; foster incipient industries and small and medium enterprises (SMEs); and provide financial 
services to low-income households.  
 
In emerging market economies, for instance, DBs usually constitute the main source of long term credit, 
loan guarantees, and other financial services in the infrastructure, housing and agriculture sectors. Even in 
some advanced economies, where private financial institutions and capital markets satisfy the financial 
needs of firms and individuals, several DBs continue to play an active role in providing financial services 




                                                           
2 Examples include Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW) in Germany, Japan Development Bank, and Business Development 
Bank of Canada.  6 
 
DBs by Year of Establishment  
 
As  illustrated in  Figure  1,  12%  of  DBs  examined  in  the  survey  were  established  before  1946,  49% 
between 1946 (after the end of World War II) and 1989, and 39% between 1990 and 2011. These figures 
reveal two interesting features of DBs.  
 
First, a large number of the surveyed DBs were established more than three decades ago and are currently 
still in operation, despite the strong criticism against DBs in the 1980s and 1990s and the growing role of 
private financial institutions. This suggests that most governments still see in their DBs a relevant tool to 
promote economic growth.  
 
Figure 1.  DBs by Year of Establishment 
(percent of DBs) 
  
 
Secondly,  during  the  past  21  years,  as  governments  around  the  world  were  privatizing  state-owned 
financial institutions, several countries were establishing new DBs. Examples of DBs established in the 
recent  past  include:  Bulgarian  Development  Bank,  SME  Development  Bank  of  Thailand,  Financiera 
Rural (Mexico), Export Credit Guarantee Agency of Oman, Small Industries Development Bank of India, 
and Banco de Poupanca e Credito (Angola), to name a few. As this report is being written, new DBs are 
being established in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malawi, and Mozambique, among other countries. 
Even in the UK, the media has recently reported plans to establish a new development bank.
3  
Size of DBs 
 
At the end of 2009, the DBs in the survey reported total assets in the amount of US $2.01 trillion dollars 
and a combined loan portfolio of US $1.59 trillion dollars. Figure 2 groups the DBs into small (less than 
US$1 billion dollars in assets), medium ($1 to $9.9 billion dollars), large ($10 to $99 billion dollars) and 
mega-banks (more than $100 billion dollars in assets). So, by the end of 2009, 51% of the surveyed DBs 
                                                           
3 In the UK, a new “Green Bank”  will be established in 2012 to finance environmental projects. In the USA, the Obama 
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were grouped as small, 33% medium, 11% large and 5% were megabanks.  The megabank group includes 
China  Development  Bank,  Brazil  Development  Bank  (BNDES),  North  Rhine-Westphalia  Bank 
(Germany), and Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbfau (Germany). In terms of assets, China Development 
Bank, Brazil Development Bank and Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbfau (KfW) are larger than the World 
Bank Group. 
 
Figure 2.  DBs by Assets in 2009 
(percent of DBs) 
  
 
From a country perspective, most individual DBs tend to be relatively small institutions, holding a small 
share of the market in terms of assets. In 80% of cases, individual DBs account for less than 3% of the 
assets of the banking systems of the countries in which they operate.  
 
There  is,  however,  a  small  group  of  DBs  that  have  become  large  players  in  their  banking  systems, 
particularly in small economies. For example, the Development Bank of the Cook Islands accounts for 
11% of total assets in the banking system, Fiji Development Bank for 11%, and Rwanda Development 
Bank for 12%. In a few large economies, some individual DBs also have a significant share of the market. 
For instance, T.C. Ziraat Bankasi (Agriculture Bank) in Turkey, Brazil National Development Bank, and 
Land Bank of Philippines account for 15%, 10% and 9% respectively of the total assets in their banking 
systems.  
Table 2.  Market Share of Selected DBs in 2009 
(percentage of total assets of their banking systems) 
DBs  Market Share 
1. Agriculture Bank of Turkey   15% 
2. Rwanda Development Bank   12% 
3. Fiji Development Bank   11% 
4. Brazil National Development Bank   10% 

















More than US $100 
billion dollars
US$10 to $99 billion
US$1 to $9.9 billion
Less than US$1 
billion8 
 
Countercyclical Role of DBs 
 
Another interesting finding is that between the end of 2007 and the end of 2009, the combined loan 
portfolio of DBs increased from US $1.16 trillion to US $1.58 trillion dollars. In nominal terms, this 36% 
increase, in just three years, is well above the 10% increase in private bank credit for the countries 
surveyed during the same period. Most DBs in the survey assumed a countercyclical role by increasing 
their supply of credit to private firms in their jurisdictions to partially mitigate the credit crunch associated 
with the global financial crisis (Figure 3).  
 
DBs  increased  short  and  long  term  lending,  not  only  to  their  existing  customers,  but  also  to  new 
customers from private commercial banks which faced temporary difficulties in refinancing their loans or 
acquiring new lines of credit. Even large multinationals, like the auto-maker Chrysler, benefited from 
loans provided by DBs in middle income countries.
4 However, it remains to be seen how the new loans 
will perform.  
 
Figure 3.  Loan Portfolio of DBs 
(per trillion $U.S.) 
  
 
As shown in Table 3, between the end of 2007 and 2009, only 16% of the institutions in the survey 
experienced a negative growth in their loan portfolios; 27% of DBs recorded a loan portfolio growth 
between 0% and 20%, 33% between 20% and 50%, 15% between 50% and 100%, and 9% of DBs 
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Table 3.  Credit Growth Rate in DBs (2007-2009) 
Growth Rate  % of DBs 
Negative growth  16% 
0 to 20%  27% 
20% to 50%  33% 
50% to 100%  15% 
More than 100%  9% 
Total  100% 
 
The  highest  growth  rates  were  recorded  by  the  Bulgarian  Development  Bank  (275%),  Corporacion 
Financiera  Nacional  of  Ecuador  (174%),  Slovene  Export  and  Development  Bank  (145%),  Agencia 
Financiera de Desarrollo of Paraguay (128%) and Banco del Estado of Ecuador (122%). Regionally, the 
loan portfolios of the DBs in Asia experienced the highest growth rate (72%) in this period, followed by 
Americas (70%), Africa (60%), and Europe (12%).  
3.  Ownership and Funding 
 
Typically DBs are institutions owned, administered, and controlled by the government (state), which 
provides the strategic direction of the DB and appoints their senior management and board members. The 
extent of government ownership in DBs, however, can vary. As illustrated in Figure 4, while 74% of the 
DBs  surveyed  are  entirely  government  owned  and  controlled,  in  another  21%  the  private  sector 
participates as minority shareholder, holding between one and 49% of the total shares. Some institutions 
in this category are Credit Guarantee Corporation (Malaysia), Banque de l'Habitat de Côte d'Ivoire, and 
Finagro (Colombia). In this type of DB, the government maintains control of the institution, while the 
private sector owns part of its capital. Interestingly, in 5% of these DBs the government owns less than 
50% of the capital of the DB. An example of this type of DB is DFCC of Sri Lanka, which, despite being 
partially privatized and fully managed by the private sector, retains its focus on developmental activities.   
 






State owns 50% to 
99%





There are different options for DBs to fund their business operations, including (i) taking savings and 
deposits  from  the  public,  (ii)  borrowing  from  other  financial  institutions,  (iii)  raising  money  in  the 
domestic or international capital markets, (iv) using their own equity, and (v) receiving budget allocations 
from the government. Most DBs combine all these funding options.  
 
Except in situations where the mandate of the DB is to promote savings, some authors (Rudolph 2007) 
argue that it is undesirable for DBs to take deposits from the general public. Avoiding this allows the DBs 
to focus on their lending operations while avoiding competition with private banks and, at the same time 
limit potential taxpayers‟ exposure to losses. Moreover, the distinction between a development bank and a 
commercial bank might become blurred when DBs are allowed to offer savings and deposits accounts to 
the general public. As shown in Table 4, 41% of DBs raise deposits from the public while the other 59% 
does not. All deposit-taking DBs in the survey are retail lenders, that is, they lend directly to customers; 
no  second-tier  institution  (DBs  that  lend  through  to  other  private  financial  institutions  to  reach  end 
customers) takes deposits from the general public. 
 
Table 4.  Funding Features of DBs 
 
Features  Yes  No 
Does your institution take deposits from the general public?  41%  59% 
Can your institution borrow from other financial institutions or issue 
debt in local markets? 
89%  11% 
Does  your  institution  receive  direct  budget  transfers  from  the 
government? 
40%  60% 
Does the government guarantee your institution‟s debt?  64%  36% 
 
When asked whether they can borrow from other financial institutions or raise money in capital markets, 
89% of the DBs surveyed responded positively. Nevertheless, most institutions require governmental 
approval to do so, particularly if the debt is to be guaranteed by the government. However, there are some 
interesting findings in the small group of DBs that are restricted from borrowing from other financial 
institutions or capital markets. For example, Financiera Rural of Mexico, established in 2002, was obliged 
by law to fund its operations solely through its own capital. In 2002, the Mexican government liquidated 
its old agriculture development bank and established a new agriculture DB, Financiera Rural, which was 
banned from borrowing from the market and taking deposits from the public. This end result was to 
minimize any liability to the government in the event of failure.
5 
 
Generally,  DBs  are  expected  to  be  profitable  and  financially  self -sustainable,  and  non -reliant  on 
government subsidies or transfers to (partially) fund their operations. The survey found that 40% of 
institutions receive government transfers to partially fu nd their operations. It should be noted that 
receiving direct transfers from the government does not necessarily mean dependence on government 
                                                           
5 In 2009, this provision was relaxed, allowing Financiera Rural to borrow from other domestic or international DBs. Prohibition 
to take deposits from the public and issue debt in local capital markets remain in effect. 11 
 
funds. Sometimes, DBs – such as KfW in Germany -- receive transfers from the government to fund 
interest rate subsidies to a particular type of borrower.  
 
Nevertheless,  some  DBs,  like  the  Vietnam  Bank  for  Social  Policies  (VBSP),  have  become  highly 
dependent on government transfers to operate. VBSP prices most of its lending products at interest rates 
well below market rates. For some of its lending products, interest rates are even lower than the interest 
rates for its saving products. As a result, it operates with a negative interest rate spread, making it unable 
to survive without government subsidies. In fact, 18% of the DBs that receive transfers claimed that if 
transfers were canceled, they would not be able to operate on a sustainable basis.   
 
As government-owned institutions, 64% of all DBs enjoy the support of their governments who explicitly 
guarantee their debt and other liabilities. Given that 89% of the DBs can borrow from other financial 
institutions or issue debt, these guarantees allow them to borrow at a relatively lower cost and eventually 
transfer that lower cost to final borrowers. The provision of guarantees can be regarded as an effective 
way of funding DBs, provided that the “guaranteed” DBs play a complementary role, that is, they do not 
compete with the private banks. Otherwise guarantees become a source of unfair competitive advantage. 




DBs have been established with a wide range of policy or developmental mandates. On the basis of their 
mandates, DBs can be divided into two groups: (i) institutions with a narrow and specific mandate, which 
explicitly refers to the sector(s), type of customers or activities that a DB is expected to support, and (ii) 
institutions with broad mandates that are formulated in general terms without reference to any particular 
sector  or  activity.  Examples  of  this  type  of  mandates  are  “…to  promote  the  country’s  economic 
development” or the “well-being of citizens”. 
 
Table 5.  Mandates of DBs 
DBs by Type of 
Mandate 
Market niche  Percent of DBs in 
the survey 
1.  Specific    53% 
  Agriculture  13% 
  SMEs  12% 
  International trade  9% 
  Housing  6% 
  Infrastructure  4% 
  Local governments  3% 
  Industrial and other  6% 
2.  Broad    47% 




As shown in Table 5, 53% of DBs surveyed are institutions with specific policy mandates. They include 
institutions that were specifically established to support the agriculture sector (13% of all DBs), SMEs 
through their lending, guarantee or advisory services (12%), export and import activities (9%), housing 
(6%), infrastructure projects (4%), local governments (3%), and other sectors (6%). Examples of this 
group are: National Agriculture and Rural Development Bank of India, the Credit Guarantee Corporation 
of Malaysia, Hungarian Export-Import Bank, Ecuadorian Housing Bank, Banobras of Mexico (which 
specializes in large infrastructure projects), and Kenya Tourist Development Corporation. 
 
On the other hand, the other 47% of DBs are institutions with broader legal mandates and are expected to 
support a broader range of activities and sectors. Examples of these institutions include the Development 
Bank of Philippines, an institution established to “influence and accelerate sustainable economic growth 
through the provision of medium and long-term resources for the continued well-being of the Filipino 
people”,  Uganda  Development  Bank,  which  was  established  to  “provide  financial  support  to  short, 
medium, and long term projects geared toward economic development of the nation”, Fiji Development 
Bank, Development Bank of Turkey, and Development Bank of China. 
 
There are pros and cons in adopting narrow versus broad mandates. On the one hand, narrow mandates 
encourage institutions to adhere to their original mandates and gain specialization in their target market. 
Monitoring and performance evaluation becomes easier in DBs with a narrow rather than a broad focus. 
However, institutions with narrow mandates do not have the flexibility to target various sectors, in some 
cases limiting their ability to manage risk through diversification. 
 
On the other hand, institutions with broad mandates provide flexibility to DBs to finance a wide range of 
activities and sectors deemed important by the government. However, if not properly managed, DBs 
might quickly lose focus and effectiveness, be subject to different and competing demands from different 
Ministries and other government institutions, or simply have its policy mandate crept into diffuse tasks 
and activities.  
Economic Sectors and Clients Targeted by DBs 
 
The surveyed DBs operate in several sectors of the economy and serve different types of clients, creating 
a  wide  range  of  intervention  modes  through  which  governments  provide  credit  and  other  financial 
services in the economy. A DB specializing in SME lending, for example, may target a wide range of 
sectors in the economy as long as its clients remain SMEs. A specialized agriculture bank may target all 
types  of  clients  (smallholder  farmers,  SMEs,  large  private  corporations,  and  even  other  state-owned 
enterprises),  provided  that  they  operate  in  the  agriculture  sector.  The  survey  tried  to  examine  the 
operations of DBs from both sectoral and client perspectives.  
 
DBs were asked to select which economic sectors they target from a list of nine sectors - services and 
trade, industry and manufacturing, agriculture, housing and construction, infrastructure, energy, health, 
mining, and education. As shown in Figure 5, 86% of DBs targeted the trade and services sectors, 84% 
industry  and  manufacturing,  83%  agriculture,  74%  construction  and  housing,  66%  energy,  and  65% 13 
 




Figure 5.  Economic Sectors Targeted by DBs 
(percentage of DBs targeting each sector) 
 
 
Similarly, DBs were asked which type of clients they target: 92% of DBs responded that they target small 
and medium enterprises, 60% large private corporations, 55% individuals and households, 54% other 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 46% private financial intermediaries. It is interesting to note that for 
most DBs, regardless of their size or mandate, SMEs constitute the type of client they are trying to serve 
and support. This is not a surprise, since for most low- and middle-income countries; access to finance by 
SMEs remains one of the key challenges for the financial sector. Even in high-income countries, such as 
Germany and Canada, DBs surveyed in those jurisdictions also target the SME sector.  
 
Figure 6.  Types of Clients Served by DBs 
(percentage of DBs targeting each type of client) 
 
                                                           































Other financial institutions14 
 
Lending Models: First-Tier and Second-Tier Lending 
 
In  practice,  DBs  have  developed  and  adopted  different  business  models  to  carry  out  their  lending 
operations. A total of 52% of DBs lend through a combination of first-tier (lending directly to end-
customers) and second-tier operations (lending to other private financial institutions which subsequently 
on-lend  to  end-customers),  while  36%  of  DBs  in  the  survey  only  lend  through  first-tier  (or  retail) 
operations and 12% of DBs only through second-tier (or wholesale) operations.  
 
Examples of “first-tier-only” DBs include Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, Bank 
Pembangunan  Malaysia  Berhad,  Bhutan  Development  Finance  Corporation,  Nepal  Industrial 
Development Corporation, Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank, and SME Development Bank of 
Thailand. Interestingly, a large number of “second-tier-only” DBs are located in Latin America, and 
include among others BNDES (Brazil), FIRA (Mexico), Ecuadorian Housing Bank, COFIDE (Peru) and 
FINAGRO  (Colombia).  Outside  Latin  America,  “second-tier-only”  institutions  are  National  Bank  of 





Figure 7.  DBs’ lending models 
 
 
There are various advantages and disadvantages of first versus second-tier lending. Under the first-tier 
(retail) lending model, DBs deal directly with the end-customers. Often, this requires the DB to have a 
large number of branches to access its target customers. This can pose enormous pressure for agriculture, 
housing, and SME banks whose clientele is usually large and geographically dispersed throughout a 
country. In this model, the interest rate offered to end-customers can be lower, other things being equal, 
because resources are not intermediated through other financial institutions. In addition, the credit risk 
stays completely with the DB. 
 
                                                           










How does your institution lend?15 
 
Under the second-tier (or wholesale) lending model, DBs tend to have lower operating costs because 
financing is provided by the DB to private financial institutions which subsequently select and assess the 
loan applications of end-customers. Under this model, the DB can reach more end-customers and cover 
more locations without incurring high operating costs. This model also promotes the growth of private 
financial  intermediaries  that  become  the  arms  of  DBs  that  reach  under-served  sectors  and  clients. 
Moreover, the credit risk is partially absorbed by the private financial institution that intermediates the 
DBs‟ funds. As discussed below, second-tier DBs tend to report lower non-performing loan ratios than 
first-tier  DBs.  However,  interest  rates  for  end-customers  tend  to  be  higher  because  private  financial 
institutions pass on to them their cost of financial intermediation plus any other margins.  
 
Lending Products and Maturity of Loans 
The  survey  also  inquired about the  types  of lending  products  that  DBs  offer  to their  customers.  As 
illustrated in Figure 8, the majority of loans offered by DBs are long-term loans (90%) followed by 
working capital loans (85%), whereas syndicated loans consisted of 52% of all DBs, and unsecured loans 
25%.   
 
 
Figure 8.  Lending Products Offered by DBs 
(Percentage of DBs offering each product) 
 
 
The survey examined the maximum maturity of the long-term loans that DBs offer to their customers. 
Often, the lack or limited availability of long-term financing in developing countries has been a strong 
justification for the existence of DBs. As shown in the following table, only 13% of DBs offer loans with 
a maturity of more than 20 years whereas for most DBs, the maximum maturity is less than 20 years.  







0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Long-term loans
Loans for working capital
Bridge or short-term loans
Syndicated loans
Loans for new product launch activities
Unsecured loans (for intangible assets)16 
 
 
Table 6. Maximum Loan Term Offered by DBs 
Maximum loan term 
Percent 
of DBs 
Up to 5 years  16% 
6 to 10 years  29% 
11 to 15 years  19% 
16 to 20 years  22% 
21 to 25 years  7% 
26 to 30 years  6% 
Total  100% 
 
Use of subsidized interest rates 
The provision of credit at subsidized interest rates by DBs has been a controversial issue. For some 
authors, this practice might undermine the solvency and profitability of DBs and distort the competitive 
environment.  For  others,  the  use  of  subsidized  interest  rates  might  be  justifiable  to  support  nascent 
enterprises provided that subsidies are transparent and used for their intended purposes (Scott 2007).  
 
The provision of credit at subsidized interest rates is a practice adopted by 50% of DBs covered in the 
survey.  In  this  category,  66%  of  DBs  fund  these  subsidies  using  transfers  from  their  respective 
governments. In some countries however, this practice has become unsustainable given the large fiscal 
pressures it causes. Other means of funding subsidies include cross-subsidization from profitable areas of 
business and also access to cheaper funds from large international financial institutions, such as the World 
Bank, European Investment Bank or any of the regional development banks.  
 
Other financial and non-financial services 
Supplementing  their  lending  operations,  DBs  also  offer  a  wide  range  of  financial  and  non-financial 
products to their customers. In terms of financial products, the survey found that 73% of all DBs offer 
loan guarantee products to partially offset the losses faced by a private financial intermediary when a 
customer defaults. The guarantees usually take different modalities in terms of coverage and pricing, that 
were not explored in the survey. However, an interesting point is that most DBs see this type of financial 
product as a useful instrument to encourage private commercial banks and other financial institutions to 
lend with their own resources to the same clients and sectors that DBs target. For some DBs such as 
FIRA, loan guarantees have become almost as important in terms of value as their own lending portfolios. 
A useful exercise beyond the scope of this survey, would be to compare the different modalities of credit 
guarantees and assess their impact, pricing and financial sustainability.  
 
Of the DBs surveyed, 30% offer leasing services and 16% factoring services. A well known factoring 
program is provided by NAFIN of Mexico (see Klapper 2006) which offers online reverse factoring 
services to a large number of SMEs. Securitization services are also offered by 16% of the institutions.  
In terms of non-financial products, the survey found that a large number of institutions offer several 
advisory services, capacity building, and training programs for their existing and prospective clients. In 
most cases, the costs of these services are absorbed directly by the DBs. In practically all second tier 
institutions, the scale of these offerings is quite large. They include a wide range of activities to support 17 
 
their  own  network  of  private  financial  intermediaries  that  borrow  from  them  to  lend  to  their  end 
customers.  These  customers  can  then  use  the  funds  to  finance  new  business  development,  capital 
enhancement, training for staff, interest rate subsidies, IT equipment, etc. The scope and performance of 
advisory services provided by DBs could be the topic of a separate study.   
5.  Asset Quality and Return 
 
A  common  criticism  against  DBs  is  they  are  institutions  that  are  prone  to  experience  asset  quality 
problems. DBs are often portrayed as institutions with a limited capacity to assess borrowers‟ capability 
and  willingness  to  repay  their  loans.  They  are  also  portrayed  as  having  a  limited  capacity  for  debt 
collection on loans, resulting in a high amount of non-performing loans, debt forgiveness programs, and 
financial losses that are ultimately borne by taxpayers.  
 
The survey collected data on the non-performing loan (NPL) ratios of DBs. As shown in Figure 9, at the 
end of 2009, 55% of DBs reported NPL ratios of less than 5%; 30% of DBs reported NPL ratios between 
5% and 30% and 15% of DBs reported ratios of more than 30%. This distribution remained almost 
unchanged over the 2006-2009 period.
8 Second-tier-only DBs reported lower NPL ratios than “retail-only 
DBs”. Indeed, all “second-tier-only” DBs fell within the less than 5% bracket while only 27% of “retail-
only” DBs were in this bracket.  
 
A comparison of the NPL ratios of DBs with the NPL ratios of their respective banking systems
9 shows 
that 39% of DBs exceeded the national average in 2009, while the other 64% of DBs was below the 
national average.  For the years 2006 and 2008, the percentage of DBs with NPL ratios below the average 
in their banking systems was 57%, and in 2007 it was 58%.  
   
                                                           
8 Rules for the definition and classification of NPLs differ across countries. Therefore, one should be cautious when interpreting 
and comparing them. 
9 Average NPLs of banking systems were obtained from the International Financial Statistics online database. 18 
 
Figure 9.   Distribution of DBs by levels of NPLs 
 (Percentage of DBs in each NPL range) 
 
 
The survey found that in 2009, 14% of the surveyed DBs reported losses. The remaining 86% were 
profitable or broke even. The percentage of DBs reporting losses in 2006, 2007 and 2008 was 15%, 8%, 
and 9%, respectively.  
 
Given that profit maximization is not the main objective of DBs, their returns tend to underperform the 
average return of the banking system. In 2009, 53% of the surveyed DBs had a Return on Assets (ROA) 
exceeding the average of their banking systems. This was up from 42% in 2006 and 2007, and 46% in 
2008. In terms of the Return on Equity (ROE), 19% of DBs exceeded the national average in 2009 (up 
from 15% in 2006, 13% in 2007, and 18% in 2008).   
   
53% 53% 53% 55%
14% 18% 14% 10%
14% 8%
11% 16%
4% 4% 8% 5%
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Less than 5% 5% to 9.9% 10% to 19.9% 20% to 29.9% More than 30%19 
 
Figure 10.  Return of Assets and Equity 
(percentage, 2009) 
 
6.  Corporate Governance Arrangements 
 
Good corporate governance is a critical component for the success of DBs. In broad terms, corporate 
governance refers to “…the process and structure for overseeing the direction and management of a 
corporation so that it carries out its mandate and objectives effectively”.  
 
The governance in a DB can be more challenging than in private financial intermediaries. To begin with, 
the  structure  of  DB  ownership  and  control  can  be  more  complex,  involving  a  large  number  of 
governmental institutions (ministries of finance, agriculture, housing, trade, labor, etc.), and sometimes 
even the legislature. These entities all have their own legitimate (and sometimes conflicting) expectations 
regarding the goals the DB should accomplish.  
 
When the mandate of the DB is stated only in general and broad terms, senior government officials or 
elected politicians have more room to influence the direction and activities that a DB pursues. Unless the 
institutional framework of a DB is strong enough to withstand undue political pressure, a DB can become 
vulnerable  to  political  interference  or  be  captured  by  interest  groups  exerting  pressure  on  it  to  take 
excessive credit risks, thus causing future financial losses for the DB.  
 
Moreover, as government owned institutions, DBs rarely face the risk of takeover. This, combined with 
the absence of a sound monitoring and evaluation framework, can cause the board and management of 


























Many  of  the  problems  that  commonly  afflict  state  financial  institutions,  such  as  weak  performance, 
financial  problems,  diffuse  mandates,  unfair  competition  with  the  private  sector,  capture  by  interest 
groups, etc. can be associated with, if not attributed directly to, weaknesses in corporate governance.  
The survey tried to examine a few characteristics of the corporate governance framework of DBs, keeping 
in mind that an extensive review of this topic is beyond the scope of this survey. First, participating DBs 
were asked about the size and composition of their boards. The results show that, on average, the boards 
of DBs are composed of 8 members, with 22% of DBs having more than 10 members on their boards.  
 
Results also show most boards consist of government representatives, including members representing 
ministries of finance, labor, trade, housing, social affairs, and even the central bank. Interestingly, 75% of 
DBs allow the participation of independent (non-government affiliated) members. In 30% of those cases, 
such  as  Bank  of  Cook  Islands  or  Credit  Guarantee  Corporation  of  Malaysia,  independent  members 
constitute the majority of the board. In a few cases, such as Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank and 
Antigua and Barbuda Development Bank, boards are comprised entirely of independent members. 
 
Examining governance issues in DBs can lead one to question whether public servants should serve on 
the boards of DBs. Arguments can be made for and against this issue. The main argument in favor of this 
is that as representatives of the government public servants can provide strategic direction and ensure the 
DB fulfills its mandate in an efficient and effective manner. The main argument against this is that public 
servants  might  be seen  by  other  board  members  as having  inordinate  powers,  and  therefore  be in a 
position to inappropriately influence the decisions and direction of the board. While the issue remains 
unresolved, there is  a  general  consensus that  when public  servants  are appointed to the board,  their 
numbers should be limited, they should meet the necessary qualifications and they should have the same 
obligations and roles as any other board member (Scott, 2007).  
 
The survey found that a large percentage of DBs have adopted a series of minimum requirements for 
board members. As much as 91% of DBs require that board members have a minimum level of education, 
87% require minimum technical qualifications in the banking field, and 75% require board members not 
to have bankruptcy records. In all the DBs the government retains the ultimate power to appoint and 
remove board members and CEOs.  
 
Transparency 
Effective corporate governance depends on the flow of accurate, timely and relevant information within 
the  DB,  and  externally  to  the  government,  legislature  and  the  public.  The  survey  looked  at  the 
transparency of DBs with regard to the information disclosed to the public in select areas. Table 7 shows 
that 96% of DBs prepare and publish their annual reports, most of which are available online on their own 
websites; 93% also disclose their audited financial statements. However, only 71% of DBs disclose off-
balance sheet items, when applicable. A smaller percentage of DBs (63%) disclose their governance and 
risk management framework, and 64% their regulatory capital and capital adequacy ratio (CAR).  
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Table 7.  Transparency of DBs 
Disclosed Information  Percentage of DFIs 
Annual report  96% 
Audited financial statements  93% 
Off-balance sheet items  71% 
Governance and risk management framework  63% 
Regulatory capital and capital adequacy ratio  64% 
 
 
The  capacity  of  DBs  to  identify,  measure,  and  manage  their risks  is  a critical  element for  adequate 
governance  and  overall  performance.  A  total  of  88%  of  DBs  indicated  they  have  in  place  risk 
management units. Their effectiveness is a measurement that needs to be done separately. Of those DBs 
that have risk management units, only 53% have procedures allowing them to report directly to the 
Boards. 
 
To encourage DBs to remain financially sound some DBs are legally obliged to achieve a minimum 
return on capital, such as:  
 
  Maintaining real capital constant (earn a return not lower than inflation), such as Financiera Rural 
of Mexico and Credit Bank of Turkey 
  Achieving a rate of return not lower than the government‟s long-term borrowing cost, such as the 
Business Development Bank of Canada. 
  Explicit return on capital (ranging from 7% - 11% annually), such as the Development Bank of 
Samoa, Samoa Housing Corporation, the EXIM Bank of India, Tonga Development Bank, and 
Kommunalbanken of Norway.  
 
7.  Regulation and Supervision of DBs 
 
There is a broad international consensus that DBs and other financial institutions owned or controlled by 
the  government  or  state,  should  have  the  regulation  and  supervisory  standards  of  private  financial 
institutions.
10 By doing so, DBs will be subjected to the same solvency, liquidity, governance, accounting, 
and transparency standards of private sector institutions, whenever applicable. Moreover, in the event of 
financial problems in DBs, the regulator is expected to act and take the same preventive or remedial 
actions normally undertaken with private financial institutions.  
 
The survey found that 76% of DBs are in fact regulated and supervised by the same institution that  
supervises private commercial banks in their countries, such as the central bank or the bank supervisory 
agency. The remaining 24% are supervised by the same ministries and government agencies providing 
their strategic direction, such as the Ministries of  Industry, Trade, Housing, Agriculture, Energy, Labor, 
                                                           
10 See Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision. 22 
 
etc. Examples of DBs supervised by ministries include National Development Bank of Palau, Samoa 
Housing Corporation, Export Credit Guarantee Agency of Oman, SME Development Bank of Thailand, 
and Uganda Development Bank.  
 
Prudential supervision by the ministry providing the strategic direction raises multiple problems. First, the 
ministry  or  agency  exercising  the  supervisory  function  usually  does  not  have  the  same  expertise  to 
monitor and assess the risks associated with the business of the DBs under their umbrella as a central 
bank or bank supervisory agency. Secondly, it is frequently the case that conflicts of interest arise, and in 
the  event  of  financial  problems  the  supervising  institution  becomes  forbearing,  delaying  prompt 
corrective action or even the simple recognition and disclosure of problems.   
 
The results show 78% of DBs indicated they are required to comply with the same standards of prudential 
supervision  (minimum  capital,  minimum  capital  adequacy  requirements,  loan  classification  and 
provisioning, etc.) of private commercial banks or any other private financial institution. The remaining 
22% are subjected to other standards, which are usually more lenient than the standards applicable to 
private banks. For example, some DBs in Africa (e.g. the Uganda Development Bank) indicated that they 
follow the prudential standards of the African Association of Development Finance Institutions. Deposit-
taking DBs (98%) tend to comply more with the same prudential standards as commercial banks than 
non-deposit-taking DBs (68%). 
 
In complement to a sound and effective regulatory system, 45% of DBs in the sample are required to be 
rated by an internationally recognized rating agency. The remaining 55% are not. Most of the unrated 
DBs tend to be small in terms of assets, although that does not constitute a strong argument against the 
need  for  a  rating.  Almost  all  DBs  (97%)  reported  that  they  are  legally  required  to  be  audited  by  a 
professional external auditor. 
 
8.  Challenges for DBs 
 
Table 8 shows some of the main weaknesses and challenges being faced by DBs. For 71% of DBs the 
most important challenge was the need to improve their risk management capacity. This reflects the 
difficulties  they  face  throughout  the  entire  lending  cycle,  which  includes  the  assessment  of  their 
prospective clients‟ creditworthiness, the way they assess risks, the type of credit policies they follow, and 
the capability they have to collect on loans or execute collateral, whenever applicable. 
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Table 8.  Challenges Faced by DBs 
What are the most important challenges facing your institution going forward?  Percentage of DBs 
Improve risk-management capacity  71% 
Become financially self-sustainable?   59% 
Improve corporate governance and transparency  50% 
Acquire more flexibility to hire and retain highly qualified staff  40% 
Reduce undue political interference  31% 
 
As many as 59% of the DBs indicated that the need to become a financially self-sustainable organization 
was a key challenge, reflecting perhaps a need to reduce their reliance on governmental budget transfers 
and to improve their own profitability. Moreover, 50% saw the need to improve corporate governance and 
transparency as a major challenge; 40% need more flexibility to hire and retain highly qualified staff and 
31% felt that reducing undue political interference was another major challenge.  
Conclusions 
 
Historically, DBs have been an important instrument of governments to promote economic growth by 
providing credit, loan guarantees, other financial services and a wide range of advisory and capacity 
building programs to low-income households, SMEs, and even large corporations whose financial needs 
are not sufficiently served by private commercial banks or local capital markets.  
 
Even in advanced economies, where private financial institutions and capital markets cover the financial 
needs of households and enterprises, DBs continue to play an active role in the economy by providing 
credit  to  select  sectors  and  fostering  new  investments  in  priority  activities  such  as  clean  energy, 
biotechnology, and environmental projects, as well as traditional sectors and activities.  
 
The ongoing global financial crisis has given DBs an exciting new role. The survey has shown that in 
most countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe, DBs have assumed a counter cyclical role by 
scaling  up  their  lending  operations  exactly  when  private  banks  experienced temporary  difficulties  in 
granting credit to the private sector. This has helped private firms refinance or roll over their liabilities 
and even access additional lines of credit.   
 
Despite the importance of DBs during both crisis and non-crisis periods, so far, little is known about the 
role they play. The survey‟s results reveal that the universe of DBs is heterogeneous and, as a result, they 
cannot and should not be treated as a uniform group of institutions. DBs differ among themselves in 
various areas, such as: 
 
  Ownership structure (fully vs. partially owned by government) 
  Policy mandates (narrow vs. broad mandates) 
  Funding mechanisms (deposit taking vs. non-deposit taking institutions) 
  Target sectors and clients (narrow vs. wide focus) 24 
 
  Lending models (first-tier vs. second-tier) 
  Pricing of lending products (subsidized vs. market interest rates) 
  Regulation and supervision (special regime vs. same regime applicable to private banks) 
  Corporate governance (independent vs. government controlled boards) 
  Transparency standards (wide vs. limited disclosure) 
 
Across countries and regions, DBs exhibit various differences and patterns. Specialized and profitable 
DBs  with  a  strong  commercial  orientation  coexist  with  other  DBs  that  are  highly  dependent  on 
government subsidies. They pursue multiple and sometimes conflicting economic and social objectives. 
New generations of DBs characterized by high standards of transparency, accountability, and operational 
autonomy coexist with institutions that continue to operate under the powerful influence and interference 
of single individuals and politicians. Deposit-taking DBs with large branch networks coexist with DBs 
that are only funded through capital markets and lend only through second-tier operations. 
 
In  practice,  the  different  institutional  features  and  modalities  adopted  by  individual  DBs  do  matter, 
because they can determine to a large extent a DB‟s ability to become financially-self-sustainable and, 
more importantly, fulfill their objectives and policy mandates in an efficient manner. 
 
Adopting the best possible institutional design for DBs is important since they operate in difficult and 
challenging environments. DBs are expected to serve clients and segments of the market with a high risk 
profile  that  are  usually  not  being  served  by  private  financial  institutions.  At  the  same  time,  as 
government-owned  and  controlled  institutions,  DBs  could  be  vulnerable  to  undue  political  pressure, 
unless strong safeguards are put in place.  
 
In the past, international experience has revealed that only DBs with clearly defined mandates, high 
corporate governance standards, strong risk management capability, proper regulation and supervision, 
and a strong management team have been successful. In fact, in the past several DBs around the world 
have  failed  due  to  poor  lending  decisions,  high  amount  of  non-performing  loans,  undue  political 
interference, capture by interest groups, and lack of well-defined mandates. 
 
The survey revealed that there is enormous room to improve the performance and effectiveness of DBs: 
 
  18% of DBs that receive government transfers claimed that if these transfers were canceled, they 
would be unable to operate on a sustainable basis.  
  24% of all DBs are under-supervised and without the reporting standards applicable to private 
financial institutions.  
  36%% of DBs do not disclose their regulatory capital on a regular basis.  
  25%% of DBs do not include independent members in their boards. 
  15% of DBs reported NPL ratios of 30% or more.  
  13% of DBs do not have minimum requirements in terms of technical skills  
  25% do not require board members and senior management to demonstrate lack of bankruptcy 
records.  25 
 
  78% of DBs have recognized the need to improve risk management as one of their key challenges 
going forward. 
 
At the same time, the survey found that in various jurisdictions innovative procedures have been put in 
place to help DBs operate in an effective manner. For instance, some DBs are legally obliged to achieve a 
minimum return on capital, measured in terms of the inflation rate or the government‟s cost of borrowing. 
Moreover, certain DBs have been partially privatized and the management has been transferred to the 
private  sector  under  management  contracts.  Certain  governments  have  also  adopted  legislation  that 
prevents them from bailing out DBs in case of failure. In other jurisdictions, DBs lend only through 
second-tier operations and share with the private sector the risk of lending to underserved segments of the 
market. Some DBs are also governed by boards fully comprised of independent members. It is worth 
exploring all these innovations as they may be part of the solutions needed to strengthen those weak 
institutions covered in the survey, in particular those operating in difficult institutional environments. 
 
Because of their strong focus on SMEs and individuals not served by other financial institutions, DBs are 
clearly an essential part of the financial inclusion agenda. They play an important role in serving new 
clients directly or through a network of private financial intermediaries, mitigating credit risks, and even 
developing innovative financial instruments to finance promising business ventures. 
 
As this report is being finalized, the global financial crisis continues to pose major risks for the world 
economy. There might be a role for DBs to play again as turbulence in financial markets continues and 
the ability and cost of borrowing of firms is seriously affected. Thus, in the short or medium terms, there 
are strong reasons for governments to continue modernizing their DBs and giving them tools to become 
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I  General Information  Answers 
1  Name of your institution   
2  Address (Street, Number, City and Zip Code):    
3  Country   
4  Website    
5  When was your institution established (year)?   
6  Under which Act or Law is your institution incorporated?   
7  What is your institution's mission or policy mandate, as defined by your law?   
8  What was your institution's ownership structure at the end of 2009?  (in percent) 
8.1  State/Government   
8.2  Foreign States/ (specify)   
8.3  Domestic private sector    
8.4  Foreign private sector    
8.5  Individuals   
     
II  Size   
9  Total assets of your institution at the end of:  (in $US 
million) 
9.1  2006   
9.2  2007   
9.3  2008   
9.4  2009   
10  Market share of your institution in terms of total assets in the banking system in 
2009 (in percent) 
 
11  Total equity at the end of:  (in $US 
million) 
11.1  2006   
11.2  2007   
11.3  2008   
11.4  2009   
12  Total gross loan portfolio at the end of:  (in $US 
million) 
12.1  2006   
12.2  2007   
12.3  2008   
12.4  2009   
13  Number of branches at the end of 2009   28 
 
14  Number of subsidiaries at the end of 2009   
15  Number of staff at the end of 2009   
     
III  Funding   
16  Does your institution take deposits from the general public? Please mark with 
"X" the appropriate box 
 
17  What was the number of deposits accounts at your institution at the end of?  
17.1  2006   
17.2  2007   
17.3  2008   
17.4  2009   
     
18  What was the outstanding amount of deposits at the end of?  (in $US 
million) 
18.1  2006   
18.2  2007   
18.3  2008   
18.4  2009   
19  Can your institution borrow from other financial institutions or issue debt in 
local markets? 
 
20  Does your institution receive direct budget transfers from the Government?     
21  If Government transfers were canceled, would your institution be able operate on 
a sustainable basis with its own generated income and profits? 
 
22  Has your institution received government funds, subsidies, or transfers to cover 
losses or strengthen its financial situation in the past five years?    
 
23  Does the government guarantee your institution's debt?     
     
IV  Business Model and Products   
24  How does your institution lend? (Please mark with an "X" in the appropriate box) 
24.1  Wholesale  (through other financial institutions)   
24.2  Retail (directly to final customers)    
24.3  Both wholesale and retail   
     
25  To which subsectors does your institution  lend? (Please mark with an X in the appropriate 
boxes) 
25.1  Agribusiness   
25.2  Construction   
25.3  Industry/Manufacturing   
25.4  Services   
25.5  Mining   
25.6  Infrastructure   
25.7  Energy   29 
 
25.8  Education   
25.9  Health   
25.10  Other (please specify)   
     
26  What is your institution's target market?  (Please mark with an "X" in the appropriate boxes) 
26.1  Individuals and households   
26.2  Start-ups   
26.3  Micro, small and medium enterprises    
26.4  Large private corporations   
26.5  Other financial institutions   
26.6  Other state-owned enterprises   
26.7  Other (Please specify)   
     
27  What lending products does your institution offer?   
27.1  Loans for start-up activities   
27.2  Loans for working capital   
27.3  Bridge or short-term loans   
27.4  Loans for new product launch activities   
27.5  Unsecured loans (for intangible assets)   
27.6  Long-term loans   
27.7  Syndicated loans   
27.8  Other (please specify)   
     
28  What is your average annual interest rate on loans?   
29  Does your institution provide loans at subsidized interest rates (below the market 
interest rates)? 
 
30  If subsidized interest rates are offered, how are they funded? (Please mark with an X in the 
appropriate box) 
30.1  Government transfers   
30.2  Cross-subsidization (using profits from profitable business lines)   
30.3  Other (please explain)   
31  What is the maximum loan term (maturity) offered by your institution?   
32  What was the average loan amount granted by your institution in 2009? (in $US)   
33  What other financial products/services does your institution offer? (Please mark with an X in 
the appropriate boxes) 
33.1  Loan Guarantees   
33.2  Trust Services   
33.3  Money Transfers   
33.4  Microinsurance   
33.5  Savings Accounts   
33.6  Deposit accounts   
33.7  Securitization   30 
 
33.8  Debt Collection   
33.9  Initial Public Offerings and Mergers and Acquisitions Services   
33.10  Corporate Bond Issuance   
33.1  Derivatives Trading   
33.12  Foreign Exchange Trading   
33.1  Environment initiatives (e.g. carbon credits)   
33.14  Property/ Assets Selling or Brokering   
33.2  Leasing   
33.16  Factoring   
33.2  Private Equity or Venture Capital   
33.18  Other (Please specify)   
     
34  If your institution offers private equity and/or venture capital, please specify (mark with an 
"X") the stages your institution is involved in. 
34.1  Pre-seed stage   
34.2  Seed stage   
34.3  Start-up stage   
34.4  Expansion and later stages   
34.5  Quasi-equity (subordinate or mezzanine)   
34.6  Venture capital funds or funds of funds   
34.7  Other private equity stages (specify)   
     
35  If your institution is involved in trade finance, please mark with an "X" the instruments you 
offer. 
35.1  Export credits   
35.2  Import credits   
35.3  Factoring    
35.4  Forfeiting   
35.5  Interbank buyer's credit   
35.6  Guarantees (specify what kind)   
35.7  Insurance (specify what kind)   
35.8  Other (please specify)   
     
36  If your institution is involved in infrastructure financing, please specify the instruments you 
offer 
36.1  Loans (specify type)   
36.2  Guarantees (specify type)   
36.3  Equity (specify stages)   
36.4  Quasi equity (subordinate or mezzanine)   
36.5  Venture capital and private equity funds   
36.6  Insurance (specify type)   
36.7  Private Public Partnerships   31 
 
36.8  Other (please specify)   
     
37  What non-financial services does your institution offer? 
37.1  Consulting   
37.2  Networking / business matching   
37.3  Training   
37.4  Other (please specify)   
     
V  Profitability and asset quality   
38  What was your institution's Return on Assets (ROA) at the end of? 
38.1  2006   
38.2  2007   
38.3  2008   
38.4  2009   
     
39  What was your institution's Return on Equity (ROE) at the end of? 
39.1  2006   
39.2  2007   
39.3  2008   
39.4  2009   
     
40  What was your institutions non-performing loan ratio at the end of? 
40.1  2006   
40.2  2007   
40.3  2008   
40.4  2009   
     
41  Is your institution required to comply with a minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) like commercial banks? 
 
42  If so, what was your CAR at the end of 2009?   
43  Is your institution required by the State/Government to achieve a minimum rate 
of return on your capital or equity? 
 
44  If so, what is the minimum rate of return you are required to achieve?    
     
VI  Corporate Governance   
45  How many members compose your institution's board?   
46  How many board members are independent (not affiliated with government 
agencies)? 
 
47  How many board members are non-executive, i.e. not involved in the daily 
management of the institution? 
 
48  Who chairs the board of directors?   
49  How often does the board of directors meet per year?   32 
 
50  Who appoints the members of the board?   
51  Who appoints the Chairman of your institution's board of directors?   
52  Are the board members appointed for fixed terms (i.e. certain number of years) 
or indefinitely? 
 
53  Who has the power to remove the Chairman of the board?    
54  Who appoints the Director General or Chief Executive Officer of your institution? (Please 
mark with an X in the appropriate box) 
54.1  The President of your country   
54.2  The relevant Minister   
54.3  The relevant Minister and with the consent of Parliament   
  Other, please explain   
55  Does the legal framework governing your institution include the following qualifications for 
the Director General or Chief Operating Officer of your institution? Please mark with "X" the 
appropriate boxes 
55.1  Minimum level of education or technical qualifications   
55.2  Minimum level of financial or banking experience   
55.3  No bankruptcy record   
55.4  Lack of conflict of interests   
56  Is the Director General appointment for a fixed term?   
57  If so, for how many years is the appointment?   
58  Does your institution publish its annual report?   
59  Does your institution disclose to the public, at least once a year, the following information? 
(Please mark with an"X' where applicable) 
59.1  Audited financial statements   
59.2  Off-balance sheet items   
59.3  Governance and risk management framework   
59.4  Regulatory capital and capital adequacy ratio   
60  Is your institution subject to specific state-owned enterprises/financial 
institutions corporate governance guidelines or requirements? If so, which? 
 
61  Which ministry/government entity represents the state/government as a 
shareholder in your institution? 
 
62  Do you need approval from the government in order to …? (Please mark with an "X" 
applicable cases) 
62.1  Determine your annual budget and operating expenses   
62.2  Modify the interest rates or prices of the financial products you offer to your 
clients 
 
62.3  Hire and fire senior staff   
62.4  Define and modify salaries and benefits structure of staff   
62.5  Define your organizational structure   
62.6  Modify your business plan   
62.7  Obtain funding from non-deposit sources   33 
 
63  Does your institution have a risk management unit, or equivalent unit, 
responsible for identifying, monitoring, managing and mitigating risks faced by 
your institution?  
 
64  If yes, to whom does the chief risk officer report to? Please mark the appropriate box 
64.1  Board or Board Committee   
64.2  Director General   
64.3  Other senior official in your institution   
      
VII  Regulation and Supervision   
65  Who supervises your institution?   
  The same institution that supervises private commercial banks   
  Other, please explain   
66  Does your institution comply with the same prudential rules (capital adequacy 
ratio, loan classification, loan provisioning, etc.) as commercial banks? 
 
  If you answered "no", please explain existing differences   
67  Is your institution rated by an international rating agency?   
68  If rated, what is your institution's latest rating?   
69  Is your institution legally required to be audited by a professional external 
auditor? 
 
70  Is your institution limited in its lending to a single borrower or a group of inter-
related borrowers 
 
71  If yes,  what is the limit as a percentage of your bank's capital?   
     
VIII  Challenges   
72  In your view, what are the most important challenges for your institution going forward? 
(Please mark with an X in the appropriate boxes) 
72.1  Become financially self-sustainable?    
72.2  Improve corporate governance and transparency   
72.3  Reduce undue political interference   
72.4  Improve risk-management capacity   
72.5  Improve loan recovery ratio   
72.6  Acquire more flexibility to hire and retain highly qualified staff   
72.7  Diversify business operations (please explain)   
72.8  Other (please explain)   
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List of DBs that Participated in the Survey 
Development Bank  Country 
1.  Banco de Poupanca e Credito  Angola 
2.  Antigua & Barbuda Development Bank  Antigua and Barbuda 
3.  Saudi Bangladesh Industrial and Agricultural 
Investment  
Bangladesh 
4.  Bhutan Development Finance Corporation  Bhutan 
5.  Banco de Desarrollo Productivo (BDP)  Bolivia 
6.  Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico 
e Social (BNDES) 
Brazil 
7.  Banco Da Amazonia (BASA)  Brazil 
8.  Banco Do Nordeste DO Brasil   Brazil 
9.  Bulgarian Development Bank   Bulgaria 
10. Rural Development Bank  Cambodia 
11. Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC))  Canada 
12. China Development Bank  China, People's Rep. of 
13. Banco De Comercio Exterior de Colombia  Colombia 
14. Fondo Para El Financiamiento del Sector 
Agropecuario (FINAGRO) 
Colombia 
15. Bank of the Cook Islands  Cook Islands 
16. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (Bncr)   Costa Rica 
17. Banque de l'Habitat de Côte d'Ivoire (BHCI)  Côte d'Ivoire 
18. Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (HBOR)  
Croatia 
19. Curacao Development Corporation (Korpodeko)  Curacao 
20. FPI - Industrial Promotion Fund  Democratic Republic of Congo 
21. Banco De Reservas De La Republica Dominicana  Dominican Republic 
22. Banco del Estado (BEDE)  Ecuador 
23. Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda (BEV)  Ecuador 
24. Corporación Financiera Nacional del Ecuador 
(CFN) 
Ecuador 
25. Industrial Development and Workers Bank of 
Egypt 
Egypt 
26. FSM Development Bank  Federated States of Micronesia 
27. Fiji Development Bank  Fiji   
28. Finnvera plc  Finland 
29. Thüringer Aufbaubank (TAB)  Germany 
30. North Rhine-Westphalia Bank (NRW Bank)  Germany 
31. Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW)  Germany 
32. National Investment Bank Limited  Ghana 
33. Crédito Hipotecario Nacional de Guatemala  Guatemala 
34. Hungarian Export Import Bank   Hungary 35 
 
35. National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) 
India 
36. Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank)  India 
37. Small Industries Development Bank of India  India 
38. Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation (ICDC) 
Kenya 
39. Kenya Tourist Development Corporation (KTDC)  Kenya 
40. IDB Capital Ltd  Kenya 
41. Mortgage and Land Bank of Latvia  Latvia 
42. Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad  Malaysia 
43. Bank Perusahaan Kecil & Sederhana Malaysia 
Berhad 
Malaysia 
44. Credit Guarantee Corporation Malaysia Berhad  Malaysia 
45. Sabah Credit Corporation  Malaysia 
46. Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos 
(BANOBRAS)  
Mexico 
47. Nacional Financiera (NAFIN)  Mexico 
48. Financiera Rural (FR)  Mexico 
49. Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la 
Agricultura (FIRA) 
Mexico 
50. The Microfinance Development Fund   Mongolia  
51. Nepal Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.  Nepal 
52. Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM)  Nigeria 
53. Niue Development Bank  Niue Island 
54. TRNC Development Bank  North Cyprus 
55. KBN Kommunalbanken Norway  Norway 
56. Export Credit Guarantee Agency of Oman  Oman 
57. First Credit & Investment Bank Limited  Pakistan 
58. Pak Oman Investment Company Limited  Pakistan 
59. National Development Bank of Palau  Palau 
60. Credito Agricola de Habilitación (CAH)  Paraguay 
61. Agencia Financiera de Desarrollo (AFD)  Paraguay 
62. Banco Nacional de Fomento de Paraguay (BNF)  Paraguay 
63. Banco Agropecuario (Agrobanco)  Peru 
64. Corporación Financieras de Desarrollo S.A. 
(Cofide) 
Peru 
65. Banco de la Nación (BN)  Peru 
66. Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the 
Philippines 
Philippines 
67. Development Bank of the Philippines  Philippines 
68. Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc.  Philippines 
69. Philippine Export-Import Credit Agency  Philippines 
70. Land Bank of the Philippines  Philippines 36 
 
71. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK)  Poland 
72. Rwanda Development Bank BRD)  Rwanda   
73. Development Bank of Samoa  Samoa 
74. Samoa Housing Corporation  Samoa 
75. Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank  Slovakia 
76. Slovene Export and Development Bank  Slovenia 
77. Development Bank of Southern Africa  South Africa 
78. DFCC Bank  Sri Lanka 
79. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan  Sudan 
80. Tanzania Investment Bank Limited  Tanzania 
81. Small and Medium Enterprise Development Bank 
of Thailand 
Thailand 
82. Tonga Development Bank  Tonga  
83. Export Credit Bank of Turkey (Türk Eximbank)  Turkey 
84. T.C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş.  Turkey 
85. Development Bank of TURKEY  Turkey 
86. Uganda Development Bank Limited  Uganda 
87. Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 
(BROU) 
Uruguay 
88. Vanuatu Agriculture Development Bank  Vanuatu 
89. Banco de Dearrollo Economico y Social de 
Venezuela (BANDES) 
Venezuela 
90. Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP)  Vietnam  
 
 
  